What Cooper's cancer records failed to show

Naming a serious illness is not the same thing as proving a medical reason for compassionate release. On October 28, 2026, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kevin Cooper's third motion. The order does not bind other cases. His records did not show inadequate care in prison, or that his cancer had become terminal (United States v. Cooper, No. 26-1123).

What happened

Kevin Cooper is serving a life sentence for a federal heroin conspiracy. A jury convicted him of conspiring to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, more than 100 grams of heroin. The probation office treated him as a career offender, and the court sentenced him to life. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2010, in United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582.

He later filed two motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Both pointed to his age and his health. The district court denied them, and the court of appeals affirmed both denials.

This appeal is about the third motion. He was 71 when he filed it. He made three arguments:

• He is serving an "unusually long sentence" under USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6). He said that, if he were sentenced today, a prior Illinois drug conviction would not make him a career offender.
• He has heart problems and prostate cancer.
• His daughter works long hours and needs his help caring for her son, who has cerebral palsy.

He also filed education certificates and records of steady prison work.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the motion. It read the sentence argument as a claim about a change in Illinois drug law, and it said that change was not retroactive. It said he had not explained how his medical care in prison was inadequate, or how his health might improve if he were released. It also said he had not shown he was the only possible caregiver for his grandson.

What the court decided

The court of appeals affirmed. It reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion and found none. That means it did not replace the district court's judgment with its own. The judges decided the case on the briefs. The order is nonprecedential, so it does not bind other cases.

The medical records missed the showing the court looked for. The court said his evidence shows serious medical conditions, including cancer and heart attacks, and delays in care for hearing loss and vision loss. Even with those facts, it found no abuse of discretion. In the court's words, he "did not provide evidence showing that he was not receiving proper care or that his cancer had become terminal." The court of appeals noted that the district court had considered his main medical arguments, in this order and in its orders on his earlier motions.

A non-retroactive change in the law was not a reason for release. On appeal, Mr. Cooper said the district court used inaccurate facts about his old drug conviction. The court of appeals said he had not clearly identified the change in law he relied on. It then said that nonretroactive changes in law are not "extraordinary and compelling" reasons, citing Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1331 (2026). Rutherford held that a sentencing change Congress did not make retroactive cannot be that reason, alone or combined with other facts. Our post on Rutherford explains the decision. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid to that extent.

The court also said his remaining arguments about the sentence were an attempt to attack the conviction and the validity of the sentence, and that those arguments are not a compassionate release reason. It cited Fernandez v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1292, 1307 (2026). Fernandez holds that a challenge to the validity of the conviction belongs in a § 2255 motion. Our post on Fernandez explains that holding. The Cooper order also describes the arguments as an attack on the sentence.

The judge did not have to discuss the sentencing factors. Mr. Cooper argued that the district court should have gone through the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including his accomplishments in prison. The court of appeals said that once a judge finds no extraordinary and compelling reason, the judge does not have to decide how large a reduction would be under those factors. The order cites Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1333, for that sequence.

What the medical rules require

The edition now in effect is the Guidelines Manual of November 1, 2026. The medical reasons in § 1B1.13(b)(1) are unchanged. In the November 1, 2026 amendments, the edit to this section replaced "Bureau of Prisons" with "Federal Bureau of Prisons" in two places. Cooper does not shorten the medical list. It shows what was missing from one set of papers.

• Terminal illness. Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) covers a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory. A doctor does not have to name a specific life expectancy. Examples in the rule include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, ALS, end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia. Our page on terminal illness walks through that test.
• A serious condition that limits self-care. Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) covers a serious physical or medical condition, a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or decline because of aging, when it substantially limits the person's ability to care for themselves in prison and recovery is not expected. See serious illness or disability.
• Care the prison is not providing. Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) covers a condition that needs long-term or specialized care that is not being provided, when going without that care puts the person at risk of serious decline or death.
• Risk from an outbreak or public health emergency. Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) covers a person at a facility affected, or at imminent risk of being affected, by an ongoing infectious disease outbreak or declared public health emergency, who faces an increased risk of severe medical complications or death from it because of personal health risk factors, when that risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner. Mr. Cooper did not raise this ground.

A diagnosis, on its own, is not one of those showings. For cancer and heart disease like Mr. Cooper's, the records usually need to tie the illness to one of the first three. Our guide to prison medical records explains how to gather them.

What this means for a motion

• Tie the records to a listed medical reason. If the illness is terminal, the records should describe an end-of-life course. If daily care is the issue, the records should show which tasks the person cannot manage in prison. If treatment is missing, the records should name the care that is not being provided and the risk without it. In Cooper, delays in hearing and vision care did not fill that gap.
• A family-care claim has its own facts. The district court rejected the argument about Mr. Cooper's grandson because he had not shown he was the only possible caregiver. The court of appeals did not write a separate ruling on that point. The guideline does. For a grandchild, § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D) applies when the situation is similar to the family circumstances in (b)(3)(A) through (C) and the person in prison would be the only available caregiver. Our eligibility guide lists each family category.
• A change in sentencing law is a different problem. After Rutherford, a sentencing change that Congress did not make retroactive cannot be the extraordinary and compelling reason. Mr. Cooper's career-offender argument did not clear that rule.
• Work and classes cannot be the only ground. Rehabilitation may be considered with another reason. It is not enough by itself. That limit is in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) and USSG § 1B1.13(d).

Our process guide walks through the request to the warden and the motion in court.