· By Brandon Sample · Court decisions
Senior Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Huy Chi Luong's motion for compassionate release. The judge signed the order on November 9, 2026. It was filed on November 12. The case is United States v. Luong, No. 2:96-cr-00350. The order decides this one case. It does not bind other courts. Read the decision (PDF).
What Mr. Luong asked for
Mr. Luong is serving a 360-month sentence for money laundering offenses. The order says those offenses were tied to his leadership of a criminal organization that committed several armed robberies. He asked for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That statute lets a judge shorten a prison term for "extraordinary and compelling reasons," the law's phrase for reasons that are unusual and serious enough to justify a change.
He gave five reasons:
- His sentence is longer than the sentences his codefendants received.
- His sentence is "unusual" in length compared with recent sentences for similar offense levels and criminal histories.
- His health is getting worse.
- He has an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer, a request that he be handed to immigration officials when his prison term ends.
- He has worked on his rehabilitation.
He also argued that the facts together were serious enough. The court rejected each reason and the combination.
Gaps with codefendants
The court said a difference between Mr. Luong's sentence and his codefendants' sentences is not "similar in gravity" to the medical, age, family, and abuse reasons in USSG § 1B1.13(b). The order relied on a 2025 Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Bryant, as it cites that case. The court said these gaps say nothing about how Mr. Luong's own situation has changed since sentencing.
National sentencing data
Mr. Luong pointed to recent sentences for people with the same guideline range. The court gave two reasons that did not work.
First, the court said the argument brings a sentencing factor into the wrong step. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) tells judges to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, meaning unfair gaps between similar defendants. The court said that factor belongs to the later weighing step, not to the question of whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists. For that point it cited Rutherford v. United States.
Second, if recent sentences are shorter because of guideline amendments that were not made retroactive, the court said it could not count them. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) and (c) exclude those changes. In the order's words, a defendant "cannot launder nonretroactive amendments through national sentencing data."
A footnote says the Supreme Court has "seriously called into question" the "unusually long sentence" category. Rutherford held that a sentencing change Congress made non-retroactive cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason, alone or combined with other facts. Our post on Rutherford explains that holding.
A challenge to the original sentence
Mr. Luong also said part of his sentence punished robberies that had already been counted. The court treated that as a challenge to the sentence it imposed. It said those arguments belong in habeas petitions, the court filings used to attack a conviction or sentence after the fact, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The court cited Fernandez v. United States by comparison. Fernandez held that attacks on the validity of a conviction belong in § 2255, not in a compassionate release motion. This order applied that reasoning to a sentence challenge. That is one district judge's reading. It is not a Supreme Court holding about sentences. Our post on Fernandez covers what that case decided.
Health
Mr. Luong is 57 and has hypertensive heart disease, which the order describes as high blood pressure. The court looked at § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C). Those cover a condition that substantially limits self-care in prison, and a condition that needs long-term or specialized care that the prison is not providing. The order says he did not claim either one. He did not argue that his daily medication and monitoring were inadequate.
The ICE detainer
Mr. Luong said that after release he would likely be removed to Vietnam, where he has no support network. The court said it was unclear how that helps his motion. The hardship would come from release, not from staying in prison, and it would happen whether he is released now or at the end of his sentence.
Rehabilitation
The court called his rehabilitation efforts "commendable." But rehabilitation alone cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) and USSG § 1B1.13(d). It can only count together with other qualifying reasons, and the court found none here.
What this order means for a motion
This order shows one judge sorting reasons into what can count and what cannot. Comparisons to codefendants, national sentencing averages, and attacks on the original sentence did not count toward eligibility in this court. Under § 1B1.13(b)(5), the "other reasons" category can reach a combination of facts. Here, the court said legally barred grounds added to thin factual ones still fell short.
If you or someone you care about is preparing a motion, it helps to focus on what has changed in the person's own life since sentencing, backed by records, and tied to the text of § 1B1.13. The motion also has to address the § 3553(a) factors.
Source: Read the source
