UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-6241

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ABDICASIIS CABAASE, a/k/a Ahmed Mahomood ,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, Senior District Judge. (2:10-cr-00057-RAJ-DEM-4)

Submitted: September 14, 2026 Decided: November 13, 2026

Before KING, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Robert M. Hansen, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, Daniel J. Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, Joseph E. Depadilla, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Abdicasiis Cabaase appeals the district court's order denying his motion for compassionate release. After review, we affirm.

We review a district court's ruling on a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Davis*, 99 F.4th 647, 653 (4th Cir. 2024). "A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law." *United States v. Delfino*, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007).

District courts use a two-step analysis to evaluate motions for compassionate release. *United States v. Centeno-Morales*, 90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing *United States v. Hargrove*, 30 F.4th 189, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2022)). First, the court must determine that the prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction because there are "'extraordinary and compelling reasons' for release." *Id.* Second, the court "must then evaluate the relevant § 3553(a) factors" to determine whether and to what extent a reduction is warranted. *Id.*

The Sentencing Guidelines identify certain circumstances that constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction, including the "incapacitation of the defendant's parent when the defendant would be the *only available caregiver* for the parent." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added). It is the defendant's burden to make this showing. *United States v. Melvin*, No. 23-6011, 2023 WL 5974872, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 14, 2023) (unpublished) (citing *United States v. Newton*, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2021)). Neither the Guidelines nor the Guidelines commentary

defines "only available caregiver." A district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo. *United States v. Carter*, 601 F.3d 252, 254 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing *United States v. Nale*, 101 F.3d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1996)). However, the factual determination whether an individual is available to provide care is reviewed for clear error. *United States v. Conley*, No. 24-6174, 2024 WL 3666171, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024) (unpublished) (citing *United States v. Petere*, 843 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2016)).

The district court determined that Cabaase's family circumstances did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. The district court found that Cabaase's mother was incapacitated but that Cabaase was not the "only available caregiver." Because two other relatives were providing care to his mother, namely, his brother and teenage daughter, Cabaase was not the only available caregiver. The district court rejected Cabaase's argument that "the word 'available' signals a lower bar to clear because it incorporates qualifiers that limit the circumstances in which someone is deemed to be 'available,'" and that, therefore, his brother and daughter were not "available." J.A. 119. Instead, the court concluded that "other available caregiver" means "other *possible* caregiver," and that both Cabasse's brother and daughter qualified because they were actively providing care to Cabasse's mother. J.A. 185 (emphasis added).

When interpreting the phrase "only available caregiver," we give the words their plain, ordinary meaning. *United States v. Boler*, 115 F.4th 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2024). The word "available" means "capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose," and that which "is accessible or may be obtained." *Ross v. Blake*, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (citations omitted). As the district court observed, two relatives have been providing care

for Cabaase's mother, which means they are "capable of [participation] for the accomplishment of [the] purpose" of providing care. Thus, the district court's conclusion that Cabaase is not the "only available caregiver" was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, contrary to Cabaase's assertion, the record does not clearly establish that his brother's leg injury prevents him from providing adequate care for Cabasse's mother. Given this record, we need not identify the exact contours of § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) to affirm the district court's determination that Cabaase is not the "only available caregiver."

The district court separately concluded that the Section 3553(a) factors do not weigh in favor of early release. The district court's opinion discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense, proportionality with other sentences, the time Cabaase has already served, and Cabaase's post-sentencing conduct. Importantly, a district court "need not address in turn every argument raised by the movant." *United States v. Centeno-Morales*, 90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024). The district court's decision provided sufficient reasoning to justify its decision.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED